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Even before the Supreme Court announced its decision in
Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, an assault had begun on state
constitutional provisions2 that restrict state power to provide
financial aid to religious institutions. The effort is not merely to
have those broadly worded constitutional provisions read more
narrowly than their language might indicate. Nor is it merely to
have them read in tandem with the new, more relaxed, federal
Establishment Clause standards.3 Nor is it merely a campaign to
have a specific program, such as school vouchers, upheld.
Rather, the campaign against state constitutional provisions,
popularly known as Blaine Amendments, has a far broader
purpose. The broad purpose for the attack on the Blaine
Amendments is to invert the traditional church-state debate over
aid to religious institutions. In this country, that debate always had
been whether a particular form of aid was permissible or forbidden.
Under the new approach, the question is whether aid is forbidden
as an establishment of religion or mandatory to avoid
discrimination against religion.
*Staff Attorney & Assistant Executive Director, American Jewish Congress. I
thank Rachel Epstein, Cardozo Law School, 2003, for her helpful comments.
1. 536 U.S. 639 (2002).
2. For present purposes, I lump all the ninteenth century anti-aid clauses
together. As other participants in this symposium have demonstrated, that is a
too simplistic grouping.
3. See, e.g., State ex rel. Gallwey v. Grimm, 48 P.3d 274 (Wash. 2002)
(Arizona, Utah, Wisconsin and Ohio also have read their "Blaine"
Amendments to accord with new federal standards).
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Under the original understanding, legislatures enjoyed
residual discretion as to funding interstitial programs of parochial
school aid. Some states took advantage of this discretion to provide
aid to parochial schools, such as textbooks or school transportation;
others refused to do so, citing their own starker vision of the
separation of church and state.
In Norwood v. Harrison,4 the Supreme Court gave its
blessing to this state of affairs. Rejecting any attempted analogy
between the power of a state to lend texts to parochial school
students and those attending segregation academies, the Court said
explicitly that a state could fund non-sectarian private schools but
refuse to fund sectarian ones:
The Religion Clauses of the First Amendment
strictly confine state aid to sectarian education.
Even assuming, therefore, that the Equal
Protection Clause might require state aid to be
granted to private nonsectarian schools in some
circumstances-health care or textbooks, for
example, a State could rationally conclude as a
matter of legislative policy that constitutional
neutrality as to sectarian schools might best be
achieved by withholding all state assistance.5
As we will see, that dicta later ripened into a full-fledged
holding, one that was followed by many courts. If, however, broad-
gauged challenges to Blaine Amendments are successful, the
debate will no longer be whether aid is permissible or forbidden,
but whether aid is mandatory or forbidden. Norwood will be
repudiated.
Since the Supreme Court has steadily reduced the scope of
the prohibitions under the federal Establishment Clause,6 the
success of challenges to Blaine Amendments would mean that
legislative discretion to deny aid to religious institutions would be
reduced to the vanishing point, at least if any private secular
4. 413 U.S. 455 (1973).
5. Id. at 462.
6. See, e.g., Arnold H. Loewy, The Positive Reality and Normative
Virtues of a "Neutral" Establishment Clause, 41 BRANDEIS L.J. 533 (2003).
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institution received aid, and, on some readings of Zelman, even if
just public schools did.
Leutkemeyer v. Kaufnann,7 a summary affirmance, noted
that given the separation principle, religious and secular schools
were not similarly situated. Some courts went even further and
held that compliance with the Establishment Clause was a
compelling governmental interest. The history of Witters v.
Washington8 is to the same effect-after the Supreme Court held it
would not violate the Establishment Clause to fund Witters'
theological training, the Washington Supreme Court refused to
authorize the expenditure under the federal Free Exercise Clause,
pointing to the state constitution's restrictions on aid to religion.
Anyone familiar with the field knows how common it is for
statutes providing aid to private institutions to exclude religious
ones. 9 To take but one example, federal aid to education programs
allow for direct federal administration of aid programs in states
with strict no-aid policies, as do some charitable choice statutes.10
7. Leutkemeyer v. Kaufmann, 364 F.Supp. 376 (W.D. Mo. 1973), aft'd,
419 U.S. 888 (1974). The Ninth Circuit recently cast doubts on the continued
vitality of Leutkemeyer in Davey v. Locke, 299 F.3d 748 (9th Cir. 2002)
(interpreting Luetkemeyer to hold that state compliance with the
Establishment Clause is a compelling interest if there are no free exercise
rights implicated), cert. granted, 123 S. Ct. 2075 (2003). Earlier, courts had
found Leutkemeyer persuasive and dispositive. See, e.g., Frame v. South Bend
Cmty. Sch. Corp., 480 N.E.2d 261, 265 (Ind. Ct. App: 1985) (applying rational
basis review to equal protection claim by parochial school children);
Janasiewicz v. Bd. of Educ., 299 S.E.2d 34, 37 (W. Va. 1982) (interpreting
Luetkemeyer as indicating that the "Fourteenth Amendment permits, but does
not require, expenditure of government funds on parochial students").
8. Witters v. Washington Dep't. of Servs. for the Blind, 474 U.S. 481
(1986), remanded to 771 P.2d 1119 (Wash.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 850 (1989).
9. See e.g., No Child Left Behind Act of 2001, 20 U.S.C. § 7882 (2003);
National School Lunch Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1756(b) (2002); see also Wheeler v.
Barrera, 417 U.S. 402 (1974) (holding Title I did not require on-premises
parochial instruction for compliance by state and local agencies).
10. See e.g., Assets for Independence Act, 42 U.S.C. § 604(a) (2002)
(permitting states receiving federal grants for family assistance and other
social services to use them "in any manner reasonably calculated to
accomplish the purpose of this [section]"). See generally Marc D. Stem,
Charitable Choice: The Law as It Is and May Be, in CAN CHARITABLE CHOICE
WORK: COVERING RELIGION'S IMPACT ON URBAN AFFAIRS AND SOCIAL
College aid statutes, under compulsion of Supreme Court cases
such as Tilton v. Richardson," Hunt v. McNair,12 and Roemer v.
Board. of Public Works, 3 insist on the very restriction now under
attack.
What is startling, even ironic, about this drive to overturn
Blaine Amendments is that it is advanced by conservative groups
even though it flies in the face of ideas fundamental to modern
American conservatism. First, it aggrandizes the federal courts
(and courts generally) in the face of expression of the popular will
embodied for a century or more in state constitutions. Those
expressions are the product of the conservatives' golden years of
the 1860s and 1870s, and not-God forbid-the lawless, riotous,
and egalitarian 1960s.
Second, the attacks seek to impose uniform federal
constitutional norms on the states at a time when the Supreme
Court's emphasis on federalism in other areas is directed at
enhancing state autonomy from federal mandates.14
SERVICES (Andrew Walsh ed., 2001).
11. 403 U.S. 672 (1971) (holding that provision of federal funds to
religiously affiliated schools for secular purposes under Higher Education
Facilities Act had neither purpose nor effect of promoting religion and
therefore did not violate the First Amendment).
12. 413 U.S. 734 (1973) (holding that South Carolina statute allowing aid
for secular purposes to religious schools for facilities used for secular purposes
did not violate Establishment Clause).
13. 426 U.S. 736 (1976) (holding that Maryland statute authorizing aid to
colleges affiliated with religious bodies did not violate Establishment Clause ).
14. See e.g., Smith v. Robbins, 528 U.S. 259, 274 (2000) ("[T]he
Constitution 'has never been thought [to] establish this Court as a rule-making
organ for the promulgation of state rules of criminal procedure.' " (quoting
Spencer v. Texas, 385 U.S. 554, 564 (1967))); Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep't of
Health, 497 U.S. 261, 292 (1990) (O'Connor, J., concurring) (noting that
although the decision validates one state's practice for protecting an
incompetent individual's interest in refusing medical treatment, it does not
prescribe safeguards for other states); cf. Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S.
639, 679 (2002) (Thomas, J., concurring) ("States may pass laws that include or
touch on religious matters so long as these laws do not impede free exercise
rights or any other individual liberty interest."); New State Ice Co. v.
Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) ("It is one of the
happy incidents of the federal system that a single courageous state may...
serve as a laboratory; and try novel social and economic experiments without
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Third, not so long ago conservatives attacked the Supreme
Court for failing to acknowledge that, when adopted, the
Establishment Clause had a federalism component of preserving
various and differing state settlements of the church-state issue,
each of which was constitutionally legitimate.15 The historical fact is
that in preserving state settlements of the church-state question, the
first Congress acknowledged the validity of some states adopting
strict no-aid policies (Virginia) while others permitted more aid to
preferred religious institutions (Massachusetts)."
By contrast, contemporary anti-Blaine crusaders insist that
the federal Constitution is a one-way street, imposing a regime of
equal treatment and a narrow divide between church and state
separation on all states. That does not sound like promoting states
as laboratories for social experimentation.
Fourth, the campaign is essentially one for equal treatment
in the face of a constitutional directive that religious and secular
beneficiaries are not equal-elsewise why have a (non-)
Establishment and not an Equal Protection Clause for religion?
An insistence on equality is not a hallmark of modern conservatism.
In no other area of constitutional law have conservatives been on
the cutting edge of a movement for equality (e.g., the civil rights
movements of blacks, gays, illegitimate children, women, and
aliens).
There are, of course, ideological flips of convenience on
both sides. American liberals have been vigorously egalitarian and
proponents of a strong federal role in overriding contrary state
policies, yet are now resisting the anti-Blaine Amendment litigation
in the name of states' rights.
Such inversions of position are not uncommon in American
politics; hypocrisy is not the exclusive province of one side.
Lawyers will make any argument that advances their client's
interest. If yesterday federalism was an argument that pro-aid
risk to the rest of the country.").
15. See Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 91-104 (1985) (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting).
16. For a survey of various state approaches to establishment issues, see
THOMAS J. CURRY, THE FIRST FREEDOMS: CHURCH AND STATE IN AMERICA
TO THE PASSAGE OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT (1986).
supporters could invoke, today it is an argument their opponents
can muster more successfully. No one ought to be surprised that
each side makes the argument that best serves its substantive goal.
I. THE SUBSTANCE OF THE CHALLENGE TO
BLAINE AMENDMENTS
Contemporary challenges to state Blaine Amendments rest
on two pillars: (1) that these amendments were based on raw anti-
Catholic bigotry and hence are a violation of the Establishment or
Equal Protection Clauses, and (2) that regardless of the motivation
for their adoption, the Blaine Amendments discriminate against
religious activity and speech in violation of the Free Speech and/or
Free Exercise Clauses. So far, most of the attention is focused on
the former claim, although the latter finds literal support in an
important recent Free Exercise Clause decision, Church of the
Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah.17
The first thing to note about these arguments is that in one
guise or another all are perfectly tenable as secular equal protection
or free speech claims. The free speech claim itself is essentially an
equal protection argument in First Amendment garb. That
religious groups feel compelled to make secular arguments is an
implicit concession of the weakness of religion in American society.
A generation ago, litigation about aid to religious
institutions centered directly on the meaning of the Establishment
Clause. The debates were about the value or danger of subsidized
religion. Today, the arguments are cast in inherently secular terms
such as freedom of speech, the marketplace of ideas, the
importance of competition, and non-discrimination.
Both legal and policy arguments are often opportunistic,
making use of whatever works and has appeal. But opportunistic
arguments have a cost. When proponents of aid to parochial
schools change the terms of the church-state debate from debates
17. Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S.
520 (1993) (holding that city ordinances aimed at suppression of animal
sacrifice by members of the Santeria church violated the Free Exercise
Clause).
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about special rules for financial aid to religion, because religion is
so powerful a force, and instead invoke secular arguments about
equality-arguments most often made by relatively weak groups in
society-they are changing the terms of the entire debate over
religious liberty. Equality arguments rest on the belief that
religious values or beliefs are not different (unequal) than secular
ideological worldviews in any salient way. That is a concession of
crucial importance, and of doubtful validity.
The popular maxim, "Be careful what you ask for, you may
get it," is as valid for constitutional law as for any other human
endeavor. The shift in emphasis from special rules regarding aid to
religion to an equality based approach parallels in time-and with
the exception of Justice Stevens who just dislikes organized
religion, in the identity of Justices-the shift from a special
protective rule to an equality-based approach to free exercise,
embodied in Employment Division v. Smith.
Decisions such as Smith would have been inconceivable
without a concomitant shift in Establishment Clause thinking from
a regime of special rules to one of neutral rules of general
applicability. If religion wants equal treatment in access to
government funds or government fora on the theory that anything
but equal treatment with secular competitors is illicit and
unconstitutional, and that it ought to be allowed an equal
opportunity to compete with secular ideas and institutions in the
marketplace of ideas or government funding, then it is hard to see
why it should not be held equally to religiously neutral laws that
apply to every other person and institution in society. Equal means
equal, not more equal.
It is not an accident that the two district courts"' that struck
18. 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
19. See Good News Club v. Milford Cent. Sch., 533 U.S. 98, 107-112
(2001) (holding that denying a religious club use of school facilities was
unconstitutional viewpoint discrimination and that permitting a religious
group to use the facility did not violate the Establishment Clause); Capitol
Square Review & Advisory Bd. v. Pinnette, 515 U.S. 753, 760-63 (1995)
(holding that permitting the Ku Klux Klan to place a cross in a public square
did not violate the Establishment Clause).
20. Madison v. Riter, 240 F. Supp. 2d 566 (W.D. Va. 2003), rev'd, No. 03-
down the religious liberty enhancing Religious Land Use and
Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA) 2 did so on the theory that
the Act provides an unjustifiable advantage to inmates seeking to
engage in religious activity (i.e. possession of religious books with
inflammatory ideas) compared to peers seeking to engage in
analogous secular activity (possession of secular books with
inflammatory ideas). That distinction, these courts agreed,
unconstitutionally privileges religion in violation of the new
equality-based reading of the religion clauses. Federalism-based
arguments against RLUIPA have so far proven unpersuasive,2 but
the equality-based argument has bite and will not be rebuffed
easily.2
The voucher program upheld in Zelman contained a poison
pill provision for Jewish schools, one rooted in equality. Schools
were eligible to participate in a Cleveland voucher program only if
they did not discriminate in admission on the basis of religion. All,
or almost all, Jewish schools (and many evangelical Christian
schools) have such exclusionary policies rooted in an effort to
create a community of believers. Catholic schools and many other
parochial schools under different Christian auspices are prepared
maintain schools as part of a social service ministry or to preach the
gospel to anyone who will listen.
At least one appeals court has hinted strongly that the
traditional special treatment for churches and other houses of
worship in the zoning law of many states may be an establishment
6362, 03-6363, 2003 WL 22883620 (4th Cir. Dec. 08, 2003); Al-Ghashiyah v.
Dept. of Corr., 250 F. Supp. 2d 1016 (E.D. Wis. 2003) overruling recognized by
Cutter v. Wilkinson, 349 F.3d 257, 262 (6th Cir. 2003) (relying upon Charles v.
Verhagen, 348 F.3d 601 (7th Cir. 2003)).
21. Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000
(RLUIPA) 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc (2003).
22. Mayweathers v. Newland, 314 F.3d 1062, 1069 (9th Cir. 2002), cert.
denied, 124 S. Ct. 66 (2003) (holding that RLUIPA is an allowable
accommodation of religious practice that satisfies that Lemon test for neutral
statutes and does not violate the Establishment Clause).
23. See Cutter, 349 F.3d at 262, 268-69 (applauding the wisdom of the
Madison and Al-Ghashiyah opinions and holding RLIUPA violative of the
Establishment Clause).
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of religion.2' The argument is that departures from a neutral rule of
zoning cannot be justified by the Free Exercise Clause because
25
neutral laws of general applicability do not implicate that clause.
The special, favored treatment given religious institutions gives
them a leg up over their secular competitors and often cannot be
justified under an equality-focused reading of the religion clauses.
For advocates of religious liberty, the question is whether
the tradeoff between equal eligibility for government funding and
equal compliance with the law despite religious objection is a wise
and profitable one. In part, the answer depends on the extent a
particular observer adheres to a faith that has countercultural
practices that arguably violate some neutral law. Such practices
include discrimination in employment or admissions, or teachings
that are likely to be countercultural (i.e. a strongly anti-homosexual
point of view that manifests itself in employment or admission
discrimination, thereby running counter to contemporary rules of
equality.)
The wisdom of the tradeoff also depends on whether the
current trend toward secularization continues or whether in the
near future American society will become more traditionally
religious. Prophecy is not my strong suit, so I cannot answer the
latter question definitively. Since, however, the Talmud remarks
that in post-biblical times fools are among the limited class of
beneficiaries of prophecy, I hazard the prediction that it is unlikely
that the trend will be substantially reversed.
Congress talks not about rolling back the secularization of
the public schools, as represented by cases such as Epperson,2
24. Congregation Kol Ami v. Abington Township, 309 F.3d 120, 139-40
n.5 (3d Cir. 2002) (noting that the "contention that religious institutions get
preference in the land use context.., would pose a significant problem" in
light of the principle that "a local government must evenhandedly apply its
laws and cannot single out religion for either discriminatory or preferential
treatment.").
25. Of course, it is fair to argue that zoning laws are not generally
applicable given the wide number of zones and the availability of variances
and special uses.
26. Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97 (1968) (holding that state "anti-
evolution" statute, prohibiting the teaching of evolution in any state-
supported school or university, is not religiously neutral and violates the
Engel,27 and Schempp,2s but about allowing all students to pray
voluntarily and publicly if they so choose.2 ' These are not limited to
the Christian or Judeo-Christian prayers of a generation ago, but to
all prayers. Supporters of school prayer have reluctantly bowed to
the prevailing secular and egalitarian ethos acknowledging that all
faiths will have the opportunity to pray; a concession inconceivable
a generation or two ago.
One can only hope that those bringing equality-based
challenges to the Blaine Amendments know what they are doing,
and that they are not acting more out of market-based ideological
concern for increasing competition for government schools-and
shrinking government-than the long-term health of religious
schools. That many of the challenges are brought by groups more
committed to the worship of the marketplace than the worship of
God, and who pay homage to Milton Friedman, not Moses, should
give pause.
II. DAVEY V. LOCKE
The Ninth Circuit in Davey v. Locke,'o resting primarily on
equal protection challenges in free exercise and speech garb, has, in
effect, stricken Washington's Blaine Amendment from the state
constitution on the ground that it violates the federal Constitution.
Stripped to its essentials, the argument is that the government may
not fund private secular activity (education) and refuse to fund
analogous private religious speech (education). To do so is to
engage in impermissible viewpoint discrimination not justified by
any compelling interest and violates Lukumi's rule against
discrimination against religion. It is an argument with substantial
Establishment Clause).
27. Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962) (holding that the Establishment
Clause is violated when a state composes an official prayer to be recited at the
beginning of the school day, even if students may be excused from recitation).
28. Sch. Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 222 (1963).
29. H.R.J. Res. 46, 108th Cong. (2003).
30. See Davey v. Locke, 299 F.3d 748 (9th Cir. 2002), cert. granted, 123 S.
Ct. 2075 (2003); see also State ex rel. Gallwey v. Grimm, 48 P.3d 274, 284-85
(Wash. 2002) (interpreting state constitutional provision narrowly).
[Vol. 2162 FIRS T AMENDMENT LA W REVIEW
2003] ANTI-CATHOLICISM & CATHOLIC DOGMA 163
surface appeal but it should nonetheless be rejected. I leave to
others the full details of the argument and counterargument.
This argument plunges directly into several of the more
incoherent doctrines of contemporary constitutional law: what is a
public forum, what is viewpoint discrimination and when do
restrictions on government subsidies constitute illicit viewpoint
discrimination? The confusion in all three areas is notorious, but I
want to focus briefly on the problem of selective funding.
The cases are in wholesale disarray. It is constitutional to
refuse to fund an organization that uses private funds to discuss
abortion,3' but not to refuse to fund a legal services corporation that
engages in constitutional challenges to federal statutes.31 It is
constitutional to refuse to fund certain, but not all, kinds of art." It
is unacceptable to bar public-funded broadcasters from taking
editorial positions if they do so with private funds.34 (Accepting
public funds, however, does not deny such broadcasters the right to
engage in viewpoint discrimination of their own.)35  And it is
unconstitutional to bar student religious publications from access to
student activity funds where secular magazines are funded,36
although the Court was at pains to insist that it was not deciding
whether the same rule applied to funds raised from taxpayers.
37
Perhaps there is rhyme or reason to this morass, but I am
not smart enough to see it. Instinctively, one understands that in a
society where the government subsidizes so much, the refusal to
subsidize a particular viewpoint puts a governmental thumb (or
31. Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 203 (1991); see also Gary S. v.
Manchester Sch. Dist., 241 F. Supp. 2d 111, 118 (D.N.H. 2003) (remarking the
law is "anything but clear").
32. Legal Servs. Corp. v. Velazquez, 531 U.S. 533, 549 (2001).
33. Nat'l Endowment for the Arts v. Finley, 524 U.S. 569, 587-88 (1998).
34. FCC v. League of Women Voters, 468 U.S. 364,402 (1984).
35. Ark. Educ. Television Comm'n v. Forbes, 523 U.S. 666, 683 (1998);
see also Nat'l Endowment for the Arts v. Finley, 524 U.S. 569, 573 (1998)
(permitting a government agency's discretion in funding artistic expression).
36. Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 846
(1995).
37. Id. at 840-41. The Court later, however, remanded for further
consideration a Ninth Circuit case raising just that question. Gentala v. City of
Tuscon, 244 F.3d 1065, 1082 (9th Cir.), vacated, 534 U.S. 946 (2001).
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even a whole hand) on the scale against the unsubsidized speaker
and distorts the free marketplace of ideas. As yet however, there is
no persuasive answer to Justice Rehnquist's challenge in Regan v.
Taxation With Representation" pointing in exactly the opposite
direction. If the government is not free to withhold subsidies from
speech with which it disagrees, must the government fund fascists,
racists, or promiscuity if it funds the National Endowment for
Democracy, a campaign to secure equal treatment for democracy,
minorities or adolescent chastity? Since no one seriously contends
that this is the case, it remains to be explained how the Rosenberger
and Regan cases are to be reconciled.
The problem of funding is a product of applying an
eighteenth century constitution (by a Court with originalist leanings
to boot) to a twenty-first century government. The Founders
thought of a limited scope for federal government, but we do not
have such a government. Applying the Constitution as if we did
does not work at all. In my blacker moments, I think that the gap
between the Constitution as conceived and written, and the
contemporary government it controls, may be unbridgeable.
At least with regard to the subsidization of religion, the
fundamental error of those who challenge Blaine Amendments on
equality grounds is of a different sort: they treat the Constitution as
if it were a philosophical treatise on government, as logical and
orderly as a modern academic treatise on constitutional law, not as
a practical guide to the operation of government in a large republic.
I think that academic efforts to find a grand theory of the
Constitution fundamentally misconstrue the nature of the
Constitution. It is not a theoretical statement, but a practical
political document.
The Constitution was the product of intensely practical
politicians, albeit ones who had spent a fair amount of time thinking
about the science of government. It should be read as dealing with
political and social problems discretely, not globally. Viewpoint
discrimination may be a relevant rubric when dealing with
regulation of private speech. It may not be the appropriate rubric
for passing on government subsidies. Perhaps this is not a logical
38. 461 U.S. 540, 551 (1983).
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distinction; it does not have to be logical if it was what the Founders
wrought.
The document that emerged from the Founders'
deliberations was designed to implement a form of republican
government, not to be an earthly embodiment of a Platonic
republic. It was to deal with the realities of the world as experience
showed them to be and as far as the then contemporary political
situation permitted. The system they produced was the product not
of a uniform school of political thought rigorously, logically,
slavishly, and systematically applied. The Constitution was what
the Founders believed to be the best working out of what
experience and political theory taught within the confines of the
politically possible.
The Senate and the House together embody no single
known theory of democracy and representation. The exact line
between the executive and legislative power is likewise not the
product of a sleek and unassailable theory as much as practical
experience. The toleration of slavery was not a statement about
human liberty as much as it was a concession to practical politics, or
so we like to reassure ourselves. To superimpose a unitary modern
theory on what the Founders did would be unfaithful to what they
did and why they did it.
What may make sense ideally may be, and often is, wholly
impracticable. Political compromises are rarely logical; they reflect
no systematic theory of government. What is true of the
Constitution generally is true of the religion clauses in particular. It
might make theoretical sense to treat religion as any other
ideological position. Human history, as many of the Founders
viewed it, teaches that it was not wise to do so.
The Founders (and those who wrote state Blaine
Amendments) had a view of the appropriate role religion was to
play in government, and what dangers lurked if the appropriate
distance between the two was not maintained. Exactly what role
that was may not reflect solely a refined conception of theology or
political science, but practical political compromises as well as a
realistic conception of society. If the Founders thought and had
expressed clearly the view, for example, that clergypersons should
not preach election sermons, then such sermons would be
unconstitutional even if that ban was wholly irreconcilable with the
Free Speech Clause.
To read the First Amendment as if it imposed a hardcore
equal treatment rationale on Congress, and, when incorporated
against the states, against them as well, is to assume what is not
true: that the Founders were fundamentally egalitarian when it
came to religion. Without rehearsing the voluminous literature on
the subject, it is sufficient for present purposes to observe that there
is at least a cogent case for the proposition that they were not, and
that Justice Black, not Justice Thomas, is truer to the Founders'
intent when he found a no-aid rule in the Constitution. Of course,
any rule against established churches is in part egalitarian (religious
favoritism is barred and all religions are equally barred from direct
government support), but the rule does not exhaust itself in equal
treatment. Equal funding of all religious bodies would satisfy a
neutrality reading of the Constitution, but not a no-aid one.
When it comes to the present legal meaning of the
Establishment Clause itself, of course, Justice Thomas is more
important than Justice Black. But whether the rule of neutrality
Justice Thomas espouses for the federal Constitution should be
imposed on states which have clearly enunciated different rules is a
different question. Justice Thomas himself has indicated a
willingness to allow states greater leeway under the Establishment
Clause than the federal government." I take it Justice Thomas is a
true believer in state autonomy, not just the right of the states to
agree with him as against his colleagues or the Congress.
III. ANTI-CATHOLIC BIAS AND BLAINE AMENDMENTS
The second argument against the Blaine Amendments is
that they were motivated by implacable and unreasonable hatred of
the Catholic Church and that Blaine Amendments as a class are
constitutionally tainted under the rule of cases such as Larson v.
Valente4° in the context of religion and Hunter v. Underwood 41 in
39. Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 678-79 (2002) (Thomas, J.,
concurring).
40. 456 U.S. 228, 255 (1982).
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the context of race. Here is Justice Thomas' enunciation of the
argument, albeit in the limited role of abolishing the category of
"pervasively sectarian" institutions:
[H]ostility to aid to pervasively sectarian
schools has a shameful pedigree that we do not
hesitate to disavow. Although the dissent
professes concern for "the implied exclusion of
the less favored" the exclusion of pervasively
sectarian schools from government-aid
programs is just that, particularly given the
history of such exclusion. Opposition to aid to
"sectarian" schools acquired prominence in the
1870's with Congress' consideration (and near
passage) of the Blaine Amendment, which
would have amended the Constitution to bar
any aid to sectarian institutions. Consideration
of the amendment arose at a time of pervasive
hostility to the Catholic Church and to
Catholics in general, and it was an open secret
that "sectarian" was code for "Catholic." 42
The Arizona Supreme Court has accepted this simplistic
reading of history in Kotterman v. Killian43 and read its Blaine
Amendment to be little more than the federal Establishment
Clause. Laws motivated by sheer bigotry are unconstitutional. It
would be fruitless to deny that the Blaine Amendments taken as
group were aimed at rebuffing Catholic efforts to obtain funding for
their schools." Finally, it cannot be denied that some of the
rhetoric used in urging adoption of the Blaine Amendments in the• 41
nineteenth century was tainted by raw anti-Catholicism.
41. 471 U.S. 222,233 (1985).
42. Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793, 828 (2000) (citations omitted).
43. 972 P.2d 606, 624-25 (Ariz. 1999).
44. I am, however, puzzled by the Justices' insistence that the term
"pervasively sectarian" has invidious connotations. I should think that
parochial schools would be proud of the fact that their religious tradition
pervades everything they do. I certainly hope that the parochial schools to
which I send my children at least aspire to that goal.
45. See, e.g., Ward M. McAfee, The Historical Context of the Failed
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For present purposes, it will do to assume that all state
constitutional amendments are uniformly tainted in this way and
that all should be treated alike for purposes of the unconstitutional
motivation argument.46 This is, of course, almost certainly wrong.
Likewise, for example, some restrictive state amendments precede
the anti-Catholic agitation of the nineteenth century.
In many states, nineteenth century constitutions have been
rewritten and readopted several times.47 On these latter occasions,
the virulent anti-Catholicism of the past was noticeably absent and
the debates were in terms of the appropriate height of the wall
separating church and state. And of course, not in every nineteenth
century case can anti-Catholicism be assumed (some of the
amendments predate widespread anti-Catholicism). It would
require an evidentiary showing in each case.
Where the argument breaks down is in assuming that
rebuffing the efforts of a church to obtain a particular benefit is
unconstitutional bigotry or hostility toward that particular religion
or all religion. When a church enters the political fray, it cannot be
expected to be free of criticism. Just as one may argue against a
policy as being motivated by a corporate desire to enrich a
corporate treasury at public expense, one permissibly can argue
that a proposal endorsed by religious groups is designed to enhance
the church's treasury or authority without being labeled
unconstitutionally hostile to religion.
If one church is particularly visible in a fight for some
controversial policy, it should be neither surprising nor
unconstitutional if opponents of the policy criticize it by name. If
those opponents seek to embody their opposition in a constitutional
amendment, that amendment will thwart both the policy and the
church. It needs to be determined if the former or the latter is the
target.
Federal Blaine Amendment of 1876, 2 FIRST AMEND. L. REV. 1 (2003).
46. See Steven K. Green, "Blaming Blaine": Understanding the Blaine
Amendment and the "No-Funding" Principle, 2 FIRST AMEND. L. REv. 107
(2003).
47. New York's anti-aid provision, N.Y. CoNsT. art. XI, § 3, for example,
dates to 1894, but was reenacted in the face of efforts to repeal it as recently as
1967. It was also amended to dilute the scope of the prohibition in 1938.
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No one should be forbidden at pains of unconstitutionality
from arguing that some proposal endorsed by a religious group
impinges on the freedom of others to live a different moral life.
Nor should one be prohibited from seeking legislation to enhance
its view of public policy merely because a "target" of the
amendment is the contrary position espoused by a religious group.
To ban such arguments and legislation or to suggest that if such
arguments prove persuasive the result would be the
unconstitutional product of anti-religious hostility. The argument
distorts the political scales. It ignores the plain and undeniable fact
that religious groups have, in pursuit of their own interests, often
been insensitive to the rights of others.
Would there be a constitutional problem, assuming
American constitutional law governed, if each of the non-Islamic
Nigerian states adopted a constitutional amendment barring the
stoning of women convicted of adultery? There would be no doubt
that such an amendment, wholly secular in form, would be aimed at
Islamic Sharia law. If American constitutional standards applied,
should that ban be unconstitutional as anti-Islamic?
Closer to home, the Utah Constitution explicitly prohibits
any church from dominating the state. 48 Everyone knows why this
amendment was adopted and against which church it was aimed.
Yet it was enacted because Congress did not want to admit a
theocracy to the Union and so it insisted on this clause as a
condition of admittance. Is it now unconstitutional, especially since
it is not unconstitutional for a secular political party to dominate
the Utah government?
The Blaine Amendments were, at least in large part, a
reasoned response to positions held by the Catholic Church. Since
Vatican II, the Catholic Church has accepted the notion of religious
liberty.49 Despite sharp clashes over abortion, the Catholic Church
48. UTAH CoNsT. art. I, § 4 ("There shall be no union of Church and
State, nor shall any church dominate the State .... ").
49. Second Vatican Council, Dignitatis Humanae [Declaration on
Religious Freedom] 2 (1965), available at http://www.vatican.va/archive/
hist-councils/iivaticancouncil/documents/
vat-ii _decl_19651207_dignitatis-humanae_en.html; see Avery Cardinal Dulles,
Religious Freedom: Innovation and Development, FIRST THINGS, Dec. 2001, at
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is today nowhere an opponent of liberal democracy. Viewed from
this perspective, if someone today were to attack the Catholic
Church in the same terms as did the pro-Blaine forces in the
nineteenth century, their position would properly be dismissed as
anachronistic bigotry. But in the nineteenth century, the harsh
critiques of the advocates of Blaine were not anachronisms. On the
contrary, these criticisms reflected fair criticism of church teachings
and church actions. What is anachronistic is to judge nineteenth
century critics of the Catholic Church as it existed then against the
contemporary Catholic Church.
Official pre-Vatican II Church doctrine, as spelled out in
authoritative, binding pronouncements by popes who were
contemporaneously pronounced infallible, ° surely disparaged the
separation of church and state and insisted on a special role for the
Catholic Church and no other in setting official policy.
Pope Gregory XVI in his encyclical "Mirari Vos"
denounced "the absurd and erroneous proposition... that liberty
of conscience must be maintained for everyone." He warned:
Nor can we predict happier times for religion
and government from the plans of those who
desire vehemently to separate Church from the
state and to break the mutual concord between
temporal authority and the priesthood. It is
certain that that concord which always was
favorable and beneficial for the sacred and civil
order is feared by the shameless lovers of
liberty.5
His successor, Pope Pius IX, returned to this theme
repeatedly, most famously in his encyclical "Quanta Cura"
accompanied by the so-called Syllabus of Errors. In that encyclical,
Pope Pius, after quoting Pope Gregory's "Mirari Vos" (which Pope
35-39. Dulles argues that the Vatican II declaration was not as inconsistent
with Quanta Cura and the Syllabus as commonly thought, but his arguments
are not, to this non-Catholic, terribly persuasive.
50. See infra p. 176 and note 56.
51. Pope Gregory XVI, Mirari Vos [Marveling at You] (1832),
http://www.papalencyclicals.net/Greg16/glbmirar.htm (last visited Jan. 14,
2004).
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Pius quotes, calling freedom of conscience "insanity") stated:
But, although we have not omitted often to
proscribe and reprobate the chief errors of this
kind, yet the cause of the Catholic Church, and
the salvation of souls entrusted to us by God,
and the welfare of human society itself,
altogether demand that we again stir up your
pastoral solicitude to exterminate other evil
opinions, which spring forth from the said
errors as from a fountain. Which false and
perverse opinions are on that ground the more
to be detested, because they chiefly tend to this,
that that salutary influence be impeded and
(even) removed, which the Catholic Church,
according to the institution and command of
her Divine Author, should freely exercise even
to the end of the world-not only over private
individuals, but over nations, peoples, and their
sovereign princes; and (tend also) to take away
that mutual fellowship and concord of counsels
between Church and State which has ever
proved itself propitious and salutary, both for
religious and civil interests.
For you well know, venerable brethren, that at
this time men are found not a few who,
applying to civil society the impious and absurd
principle of "naturalism," as they call it, dare to
teach that "the best constitution of public
society and (also) civil progress altogether
require that human society be conducted and
governed without regard being had to religion
any more than if it did not exist; or, at least,
without any distinction being made between
the true religion and false ones." And, against
the doctrine of Scripture, of the Church, and of
the Holy Fathers, they do not hesitate to assert
that "that is the best condition of civil society,
in which no duty is recognized, as attached to
the civil power, of restraining by enacted
penalities, offenders against the Catholic
religion, except so far as public peace may
require." From which totally false idea of
social government they do not fear to foster
that erroneous opinion, most fatal in its effects
on the Catholic Church and the salvation of
souls, called by Our Predessor, Gregory XVI,
an "insanity," viz, that "liberty of conscience
and worship is each man's personal right, which
ought to be legally proclaimed and asserted in
every rightly constituted society; and that a
right resides in the citizens to an absolute
liberty, which should be restrained by no
authority whether ecclesiastical or civil,
whereby they may be able openly and publicly
to manifest and declare any of their ideas
whatever, either by word of mouth, by the
press, or in any other way." But, while they
rashly affirm this, they do not think and
consider that they are preaching "liberty of
perdition;" and that "if human arguments are
always allowed free room for discussion, there
will never be wanting men who will dare to
resist truth, and to trust in the flowing speech of
human wisdom; whereas we know, from the
very teaching of our Lord Jesus Christ, how
carefully Christian faith and wisdom should
avoid this most injurious babbling.
2
In the accompanying Syllabus of Errors, Pius IX writes that
among the modernist errors condemned by the Church (number
55) is the idea that "[t]he Church ought to be separated from the
State." As applied to education, "modernist" errors, according to
the Syllabus, included the following (numbers 45 and 47):
52. Pope Pius IX, Quanta Cura [A Number of Concerns],
http://www.papalencyclicals.net/Piuso9/p9quanta.htm (last visited Jan. 14,
2004).
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The entire government of public schools in
which the youth of a Christian state is
educated, except (to a certain extent) in the
case of episcopal seminaries, may and ought to
appertain to the civil power, and belong to it so
far that no other authority whatsoever shall be
recognized as having any right to interfere in
the discipline of the schools, the arrangement
of the studies, the conferring of degrees, in the
choice or approval of the teachers.
The best theory of civil society requires that
popular schools open to children of every class
of the people, and, generally, all public
institutes intended for instruction in letters and
philosophical sciences and for carrying on the
education of youth, should be freed from all
ecclesiastical authority, control and
interference, and should be fully subjected to
the civil and political power at the pleasure of
the rulers, and according to the standard of the
13prevalent opinions of the age.
In these encyclicals the popes also asserted the authority of
the Church to engage in censorship, prohibiting books with
erroneous opinions favoring false religions, by which it was
reasonable to understand the popes as including all Protestant
denominations. Indeed, it is reasonable to read both Popes
Gregory and Pius as being critical of the idea of political liberty
generally. This is not the only possible reading of the encyclicals
(and those of Leo XII who followed them), but it is a permissible
one and one that surely would have suggested itself to non-Catholic
nineteenth century Americans.
In the encyclical, "Maximae Quidem," addressed to the
Church in Bavaria in 1864, Pope Pius is explicitly critical of
53. Pope Pius IX, Syllabus of Errors 1 45, 47 (1864),
http://www.papalencyclicals.net/Pius09/p9syll.htm (last visited Jan. 14, 2004).
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proposals to strip the public schools of their Catholic character,
proposals he attributes to enemies of the Church interested in
spreading "license" of knowledge, which is the Protestant idea that
individuals could reach their own conclusion about religious ideas.
These papal pronouncements were made over the course of
an almost century-long papal opposition to the liberalization of
Europe. In almost every case, papal authority was ranged on the
side of authoritarian regimes and against republican modernizers.
American sentiment was largely on the other side in almost every
one of these cases.
I have not yet been able to determine how many of these
pronouncements were known in America. The Syllabus of Errors
surely was-it found its way into the New York Times shortly after
it was released. Some years later, again shortly after the Blaine
Amendment controversy, a Protestant pastor published a series of
lectures (some crossing the line into bigotry) entitled Romanism
and the Republic. He had this to say on the Catholic Church:
In the Encyclical and the Syllabus of 1864, the
Pope denounces some of the dearest rights of
man, because they are opposed to Romish
absolutism. To you who are not familiar with
these terms, I may say, that the word Encyclical
is applied to a letter or communication written
to the general public, the world at large, the
church as a whole; while the Syllabus is a
similar document, containing those
propositions, or heads of discourse, which sum
up the leading ideas which the Pope wishes to
communicate. Do not forget that these
declarations of the Pope, by his own definition,
and the definition of Romish councils, by the
consent of Romish prelates, and undisputed
and submitted to by the Roman Catholic
church, have all the force of infallible authority
and dogma. To dispute them, or refuse
obedience to them, is to make a Roman
Catholic a heretic, to put him under the ban of
excommunication, and outside the pale of
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salvation. There is not dogma of faith or
morals, no doctrine of the Holy Scriptures, that
is more binding upon the conscience and
obedience of the Roman Catholic, than are
these papal deliverances. There is no escape
from yielding to them absolutely, except to
break with the Roman Catholic church as a
whole. With fearful epithets, the Pope
denounces those who insist that governments
should not inflict penalties upon such as violate
the Catholic religion.4
Informed Americans would also have known that the
Catholic Church had opposed on religious grounds, almost all of
the democratic and political liberalizing moments of mid-
nineteenth century Europe. American Catholics were aware of
these positions, recognized that they would cause them substantial
grief, and did their best to explain them away, emphasizing that
they were intended to apply only to Europe, not the United States.55
These doctrinal statements and political positions were well
known to Protestants. Pope Pius' Syllabus of Errors, for example,
was known to readers of American newspapers. As one prominent
Catholic Bishop noted, the Syllabus set off a "howl of indignation"
16in the press. During the same period was the First Vatican
Council at which the Church debated and ultimately adopted the
doctrine of papal infallibility. This doctrine both heightened the
54. ISAAC J. LANSING, ROMANISM AND THE REPUBLIC: A DISCUSSION OF
THE PURPOSES, ASSUMPTIONS, PRINCIPLES AND METHODS OF THE ROMAN
CATHOLIC HIERARCHY 72 (Boston, Arnold Publ'g 1890).
55. See JAMES J. HENNESEY, AMERICAN CATHOLICS: A HISTORY OF THE
ROMAN CATHOLIC COMMUNITY IN THE UNITED STATES 164-65 (1981). See
generally Charles Louis Sewrey, The Alleged "Un-Americanism" of the
Church as a Factor in Anti-Catholicism in the United States, 1860-1914 (1955)
(unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Minnesota) (on file with
University of Notre Dame Library). Professor Phillip Hamburger's recent
book, PHILIP HAMBURGER, SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND STATE (2002),
emphasizes the anti-Catholic roots of modern separation doctrine, but, with
the exception of a passing reference, ignores Catholic doctrines that fueled
that bigotry.
56. HAMBURGER, supra note 55. See Dulles, supra note 49.
impact of the various encyclicals in the minds of Protestants (many
of whom probably exaggerated the scope of that doctrine) and gave
rise to a generalized fear of an anti-democratic, autocratic Catholic
Church which was seeking political power everywhere.57
Taken together, these positions gave rise to legitimate fears
about the intentions of the Catholic Church and whether it
intended to mobilize its believers into putting the Church's
officially stated doctrine into place in the United States. Whether
or not in retrospect those fears were realistic, whether they would
have carried the day if not for the addition of raw bigotry aimed at
Catholics or the (mostly Irish) Catholic immigrants, or a desire to
preserve the existing de facto Protestant hegemony, are all
questions that require more research.
The record, though, strongly suggests that Protestants were
not tilting at windmills but at a real ideological threat. The idea of
church-state separation was no doubt more congenial to nineteenth
century Protestant than Catholic theology, but it is nonetheless a
secular doctrine which citizens should be free to pursue when they
determine that the idea of separation of church and state needs to
be buttressed against an anticipated onslaught.
Blaine Amendments may be good or bad policy, and they
may or may not have outlived their usefulness, but they are not
anti-religious bigotry simpliciter.
It may be that American Catholics truly had no intention of
carrying out the doctrinal commands of the Vatican. It may be that
the popes themselves had little interest or concern with America,
being focused solely on the situation in Europe. It does not follow
that critics of the Church could not plausibly see a genuine threat to
their religious liberty in the American church's effort to obtain state
financing for its schools. On this reading, the Blaine Amendments
were legitimate attempts to protect a conception of religious liberty
different than that endorsed by the Catholic Church, but their
efforts are no more motivated by bigotry than are the efforts of
proponents of banning Sharia law in Nigeria today.
57. See LANSING, supra note 54. This book, a collection of lectures
delivered in 1888, which are a mixture of crude diatribe and reasoned analysis,
provides one roughly contemporary Protestant account.
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IV. COMPELLING STATE INTEREST
Even if one assumes that banning aid to religious schools
beyond the confines of the federal Constitution constitutes
viewpoint discrimination (or a denial of free exercise), it does not
follow that it is unconstitutional. Viewpoint discrimination is
unconstitutional only if not justified by a compelling state interest.S 58
In Widmar v. Vincent, the Court assumed that the interest
in not establishing religion could be a compelling interest justifying
viewpoint restriction on speech. 59 However, it found that a state
constitutional restriction that went beyond the requirements of the
federal Constitution could not be a compelling interest because the
truly important interest was taken care of by the federal non-
establishment provision. 6 In Good News Club v. Milford School
District,6 Justice Thomas for a majority was prepared to go farther
and suggest that non-establishment cannot be a compelling interest
justifying a viewpoint restriction on speech. 62
I certainly do not understand the latter suggestion, and have
great difficulty with the former. Compelling interests are not
constitutional provisions at war with each other, but a government
policy of such overriding importance that it can, as a matter of
necessity, override a constitutional guarantee. When a court
engages in compelling interest analysis it is not deciding which of
two clauses in the same constitution takes priority in a particular
circumstance. Whether diversity is a compelling interest in the
affirmative action context does not depend on whether the federal
Constitution (or a state constitution) requires affirmative action.
The same ought to be true of the state interest in non-
establishment, particularly in aid cases where there is no question
about state action. (This is not the case with religious speech cases
that by definition do not involve state action.) Why a state cannot
decide as a matter of highest importance that the state will leave the
58. 454 U.S. 263 (1981).
59. Id. at 271.
60. Id. at 276.
61. Good News Club v. Milford Sch. Dist., 533 U.S. 98 (2001).
62. Id. at 112-13.
financing of religious activity to private citizens escapes me. The
present Court might not like that policy, but why it should be
categorically barred from serving as a compelling interest is a
mystery.
There is more force to Justice Powell's point in Widmar that
those interests were protected by the federal Establishment
Clause," but here too it is difficult to see why a state should be held
to the limits of federal policy in defining its compelling interests.
To return to a racial analogy, the federal Constitution does not
require integration, it only bars segregation. That does not mean a
state cannot have a compelling interest in integration sufficient to
justify a use of racial classifications that are otherwise
unconstitutional.
63. Widmar, 454 U.S. at 276 (1981).
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